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INTRODUCTION 
Over the centuries, advances in technology have continually 
challenged the rights of copyright owners.  The main battle today 
is joined over the advances brought about by digital technology.  
One example of this is movie editing software which allows the 
user to play a DVD version of a movie in conjunction with the 
software and skip or mute offensive material, such as violence, 
nudity and profanity.  The technology skips or mutes material 
according to the timings of the original DVD and allows the user to 
experience an altered version of the movie which is “unfixed”—
the altered version does not exist in any physical form.  The altered 
version is not contained on the original DVD because the DVD is 
not affected by its use with the technology, nor does it exist in the 
software, which merely contains timings specific to the movie. 
The Copyright Act grants copyright owners the exclusive right 
to all adaptations of their original works under the derivative 
right.1  A section of the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act, 
entitled The Family Movie Act,2 amends the Copyright Act and 
exempts from infringement the use of movie editing software.  
However, an analysis of the policies and principles of copyright 
suggests that without this statutory exemption, the altered versions 
might infringe the derivative right of the copyrighted work.  
Therefore, the Family Movie Act can be seen as encroaching upon 
the derivative right.  Unfixed works which are capable of infinite 
repetition and which open new markets should be found to infringe 
the copyright holder’s derivative right.  In the future, we should be 
cautious in granting protection for similar digital technologies. 
Saving Private Ryan3 exposes the viewer to the reality of war 
through the story of a group of soldiers who are ordered to find 
 
 1 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000) (granting the copyright owner the exclusive right “to 
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”). 
 2 Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–9, §§ 201–202, 
119 Stat. 218, 223–24 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter The Family Movie Act of 2005]. 
 3 SAVING PRIVATE RYAN (Dreamworks Distribution, L.L.C. 1998). 
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Private James Ryan and bring him home.4  When the United States 
government learns that all three of Ryan’s brothers have been 
killed in combat, it orders that the last remaining son be withdrawn 
from combat.5 
In contrast with many other war movies, Saving Private Ryan 
gives a realistic depiction of war, by using close-up shots of the 
violence and by remaining brutally honest about the nature of war.6  
The movie opens with a truly horrific, graphic scene of destruction 
and suffering: “thousands of terrified and seasick men, most of 
them new to combat,” land on Omaha Beach and are “thrown into 
the face of withering German fire.”7  The action is filmed in such a 
manner that there is no sense of the progress the soldiers are 
making as a group.8  Thus, the experience of the individual man on 
the beach is recreated.9 
Saving Private Ryan communicates complex and difficult 
concepts using graphic images, violence, profanity, action, and 
camaraderie.10  The humiliation and destruction engendered by the 
system of war is total.11  The survival of any individual soldier 
appears to depend on luck.12  Because the mission of the squad 
sent to retrieve Ryan is tangential to the focus of the war, the 
 
 4 See Roger Ebert, A ‘Private’ Matter; Spielberg Conveys Action, Feelings of War: 
Saving Private Ryan, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, July 24, 1998, Weekend Plus; Movies at 31 
(reviewing SAVING PRIVATE RYAN (Dreamworks Distribution, L.L.C. 1998)), available at 
http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/19980724/ 
REVIEWS/807240304/1023 (last visited July 17, 2005); Almar Haflidason, Saving 
Private Ryan (1998), BBC FILM REVIEWS (updated Nov. 7, 2000) (reviewing SAVING 
PRIVATE RYAN (Dreamworks Distribution, L.L.C. 1998)) at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/films/2000/11/07/saving_private_ryan_1998_review.shtml (last 
visited July 17, 2005). 
 5 Ebert, supra note 4; Haflidason, supra note 4. 
 6 Tom Feran, Commentary: Movie ‘Cleaners’ Rake in Dirty Money, NEWHOUSE NEWS 
SERVICE, Sept. 27, 2002.  “SAVING PRIVATE RYAN . . . reenacted D-Day landings with a 
startling, close-up candor that World War II veterans said was authentic.” Id. 
 7 Ebert, supra note 4. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id.; see Haflidason, supra note 4.  SAVING PRIVATE RYAN is “an important film that 
deconstructs war machines into separate, frightened men as it so likely was.” Id. 
 10 Ebert, supra note 4. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
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movie takes on a psychological rather than a military perspective.13  
Thus, through this small story, the viewer is drawn into the effects 
of war on the psyches of the individual men.14 
If Saving Private Ryan’s extremely graphic portrayal of the 
individual soldier’s experience of war were edited, it would likely 
be easier on the eyes and the psyche of the viewer.  It is also likely 
that such edits would not change the overall plot or the 
communication of the movie’s central message.  However, Saving 
Private Ryan was truly remarkable in that its portrayal of war for 
the viewer is as terrifying as it was for the common soldier 
experiencing it.15  An edited version would dilute the impact of the 
movie upon the audience by substantially eliminating the candid 
representation of the violence of war. 
In fact, movies have started to be “sanitized” in just this 
fashion.  The editing is done in one of two ways: (1) companies 
physically alter the video or DVD,16 or (2) software developed by 
the companies, which is tailored to specific movies, reads the 
original DVD and skips or mutes offensive material on-the-fly 
without altering the original DVD.17  Where the altered version is 
created by the use of editing software, no physical copy of the 
altered version is made. 
 
 13 Haflidason, supra note 4. 
 14 Ebert, supra note 4. 
 15 Feran, supra note 6 (“SAVING PRIVATE RYAN . . . reenacted D-Day landings with a 
startling, close-up candor that World War II veterans said was authentic.”); see Ebert, 
supra note 4 (describing some of the graphic violence portrayed in the opening scene); 
Haflidason, supra note 4 (SAVING PRIVATE RYAN’S “graphic violence” has been praised 
for its “realism.”) 
 16 Christina Mitakis, The E-Rated Industry: Fair Use Sheep or Infringing Goat?, 6 
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 291, 292–93 (2004); Sharon Weinberg Nokes, E-Rated Movies: 
Coming Soon to a Home Theater Near You?, 92 GEO. L.J. 611, 616–17 (2004). 
 17 Michael P. Glasser, “To Clean or Not to Clean”: An Analysis of the Copyright and 
Trademark Issues Surrounding the Legal Battle Between Third Party Film Editors and 
the Film Industry, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 129, 136–38 (2004); Ashley Kerns, 
Modified to Fit Your Screen: DVD Playback Technology, Copyright Infringement or Fair 
Use?, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 483, 489–92 (2004); Nokes, supra note 16, at 619–20; 
Laura Jeanne Monique Silvey, Cutting Out the “Good” Parts: The Copyright 
Controversy Over Creating Sanitized Versions of VHS/DVD Movies, 33 SW. U.L. REV. 
419, 425–26 (2004). 
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The edits made to Saving Private Ryan through these sanitizing 
methods include hundreds of alterations to the original film.18  
Four minutes of the twenty-five minute opening scene have been 
deleted.19  The editing results in the elimination of “the most 
stomach-churning injuries . . . including the astounding moment 
when Tom Hanks realizes that the man he is dragging up the beach 
is no longer a whole man.”20  The editing results in a loss of “the 
very point of the movie that war is unimaginably cruel, random 
and devastating.”21 
Although the edits likely cut much of what makes Saving 
Private Ryan remarkable, according to those in the editing 
business, “the powerful portrayal of World War II combat 
remains.”22  The altered version still leaves the viewer 
“emotionally drained.”23  More importantly, the editing creates a 
greater market for the movie.  Those parents who had previously 
chosen not to expose their children to graphic violence can now 
show the movie without it. 
The altered versions created by the digital movie-editing 
technology are unfixed.  Under the Copyright Act, a work is 
“fixed” when it is embodied in a stable, physical object.24  The 
definition of “fixation” excludes purely evanescent or transient 
reproductions such as images projected briefly on a screen or 
television, or copies captured momentarily in the “memory” of a 
 
 18 Louis Aguilar, Family-Friendly or Defaced?  Colo. Stores’ Cleaned-up Movies Spur 
1st Amendment Fight, DENV. POST, Sept. 24, 2002, at A01. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Shawn Levy, CleanFlicks Throws the Baby Out With the Bathwater, NEWHOUSE 
NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 2, 2002; see Michael Janofsky, Utah Shop Offers Popular Videos 
With the Sex and Violence Excised, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at A11 (reporting that 
“soldiers die but they do not bleed a lot”); Dan Kadison, H’wood: Don’t Cut – Lawsuit 
Could Kill Companies Selling Cleaned-Up Films, N.Y. POST, Sept. 23, 2002, at 025 
(noting that the “severed limbs of dying soldiers in [the] intense opening sequence” are 
edited out). 
 21 Levy, supra note 20. 
 22 See Rich Vosepka, Turning R-rated Movies into G: Utah Video Clubs Edit Films for 
Sex, Profanity, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 18, 2001, at E1. 
 23 Id. (quoting Braxton Schenk, an owner of a rental club which offers sanitized 
movies). 
 24 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
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computer.25  Here, the edited version of the movie created by the 
use of software in conjunction with a copy of the original work is 
unfixed because the altered form experienced by the viewer is not 
embodied in a material object.  The original DVD remains 
untouched and the software is not able to recreate the edited 
version on its own.  The altered version can only be created by the 
use of the software in conjunction with the unedited, original 
DVD.  Thus, the edited version exists only in the synthesis of the 
software and the original DVD.  The creation of a physically-
altered tape or DVD for commercial profit is likely illegal.26  
However, it is unclear whether an unfixed, altered version of a 
copyrighted work is legal. 
In exploring the general question of whether unfixed works can 
violate the derivative right of copyright owners, the specific case 
of digital movie-editing software will be used as an example.  
Although the Family Movie Act exempts this software from 
liability for copyright infringement,27 the software presents a 
concrete basis on which to explore the question of whether 
unfixed, altered works can infringe upon the derivative right of 
copyright owners.  This note concludes that fixation alone should 
not pose a bar to a copyright owner’s claim for infringement of his 
derivative right. 
Part I of this note explains the concept and background of the 
derivative right and an artist’s moral rights and sets forth the 
history behind the drafting of the Family Movie Act.  Part II 
explores the principal language and legislative history of the 
Copyright Act, the case law that addresses the question of whether 
 
 25 H.R. REP NO. 94–1476, at 53 (1976). 
 26 Under the Copyright Act, the owner of a copyrighted work is granted the exclusive 
right to reproduce the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).  This right is infringed upon 
when the work is reproduced “in whole or in any substantial part, and by duplicating it 
exactly or by imitation or simulation.” H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 61 (1976); S. REP. NO. 
94–473, at 58 (1975); see H.R. REP. NO. 109–33(I), at 7 (2005), reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 220, 225 (“The Committee is aware of services and companies that create 
fixed derivative copies of motion pictures and believes such practices are illegal under 
the Copyright Act.”). 
 27 Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–9, §§ 201–202, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
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the derivative right can be infringed by unfixed works, and the 
incentive structure of the Copyright Act.  Part III applies the 
concepts developed in Part II to the specific case of the altered 
versions of the movies created by the editing software.  The note 
concludes that in order to infringe the derivative right, fixation 
should not be necessary.  However, the note also proposes that two 
determinations should be made prior to making an actual finding of 
infringement: (1) whether the unfixed work can be recreated in an 
identical fashion infinitely, and (2) whether it is reasonable to 
expect that the copyright owner will enter the derivative market 
which is being exploited by the allegedly infringing work on its 
own. 
I.  THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MOVIE STUDIOS AND EDITING 
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
A. Protection for Adaptations of Works Under the Derivative 
Right of the Copyright Act 
The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”28  This clause is generally referred to as 
the Intellectual Property Clause.  Congress enacts copyright 
statutes under this grant of power.  The copyright statutes evolved 
through amendments and revisions into the Copyright Act of 
1976—the law in force today.29  The progression of the law has 
generally been in the direction of expansion—that is, both the 
scope of copyrightable subject matter and the rights granted to the 
copyright holder have increased over time. 
The statutory expansion of the scope of copyrightable subject 
matter is attributable to the broadening of the interpretation of the 
constitutional word “writings.”30  This term has been broadened (a) 
 
 28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 29 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq. (2000). 
 30 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 131 (1994) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 94–1476, at 51–52 (1976)); see also S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 50–51 (1975). 
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to encompass technological developments enabling new forms of 
expression,31 such as the development of movies, and (b) to 
include forms of expression that have been in existence for a long 
time but not formerly considered creative and worthy of protection, 
such as music, plays and art.32  Today, the Act of 1976 gives 
copyright protection for: 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium 
of expression . . . from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.  Works of authorship 
include the following categories: 
(1)  literary works; 
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; 
(7) sound recordings; and 
(8) architectural works.33 
The definition of the rights to which a copyright holder is 
entitled has expanded with the scope of copyrightable subject 
matter.34  Initially, the exclusive rights were limited to the right to 
copy and the right to authorize reproduction and publication of the 
work.35  However, as the scope of protectable subject matter 
developed beyond books to include works such as plays, music and 
art,36 the exclusive rights were correspondingly expanded to 
include dramatization, public performance and public displays, as 
well as translations and other adaptations.37  Today, the Copyright 
Act of 1976 gives authors the exclusive right: 
 
 31 H.R. REP NO. 94–1476, at 51–52 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 50 (1975).  Some of 
these forms could be considered subject matter Congress intended to protect from the 
outset. H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 51–52 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 50–51 (1975). 
 32 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 51–52 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 51 (1975). 
 33 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
 34 1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 503. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 504. 
 37 Id. 
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(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the 
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual 
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, 
to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.38 
Specifically, the importance of protection for the derivative 
right has increased.  For example, before dramatic plays were 
considered copyrightable, an author of a book had no legal control 
over the development of a play based on his copyrighted book.  
Once plays were recognized as copyrightable, the protection 
against the theft of an author’s novelistic expression became 
important. 
The derivative right was statutorily recognized by Congress for 
the first time in the Copyright Act of 1870.39  That Act provided 
that authors may “reserve the right to dramatize or to translate their 
own works.”40  This provision reflected Congress’s response to 
case law and to scholars who were struggling with the existing 
scope of an author’s rights.41 
 
 38 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
 39 Patent and Copyright Act of 1870, 41 Cong. 2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198. 
 40 2 PATRY, supra note 30, at 820 (quoting Act of July 8, 1870, § 86, 41st Cong. 2d 
Sess., 16 Stat. 198, 212). 
 41 Id. 
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The Copyright Act of 1909 broadened the scope of an author’s 
derivative right by giving a copyright owner the exclusive right: 
[t]o translate the copyrighted work into other languages or 
dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a 
literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work; to 
convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a 
drama; to arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to 
complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model or design 
for a work of art . . . .42 
By broadening the scope of the derivative right, Congress 
intended to codify the “existing law as construed by the courts.”43 
Finally in the 1976 Act, Congress granted the author the 
exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work.”44  The 1976 Act defines derivative works as: 
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as 
a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, 
art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other 
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted [or a] work consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as 
a whole, represent an original work of authorship . . . .45 
The derivative right overlaps with the reproduction right.  
However, the derivative right is a broader  right in that the 
“reproduction requires fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas 
the preparation of a derivative work . . . may be an infringement 
even though nothing is ever fixed in a tangible form.”46  
Nevertheless, the derivative right is limited by the requirement that 
 
 42 Copyright Act of 1909, § 1(b), Pub. L. No. 60–349, 35 Stat. 1075, available at 
http://www.kasunic.com/1909_act.htm (last visited July 21, 2005). 
 43 2 PATRY, supra note 30, at 821 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 60–2222, at 4 (1909); S. REP. 
NO. 60–1108, at 4 (1909)). 
 44 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000). 
 45 Id. § 101. 
 46 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976); see also ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: 
HOWELL’S COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE 1976 ACT 175 (5th ed. 1979). 
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the work be based upon the copyrighted work.47  In addition, to 
infringe the derivative right, the allegedly infringing work must 
incorporate the copyrighted work in some form.48 
The Copyright Act does not specify whether that form must be 
physical.49  The legislative history suggests that the form need not 
be physical.50  Therefore, the derivative right potentially protects 
copyright owners against the unfixed, altered versions created by 
the movie-editing software. 
B  Protection Against Modifications of a Work  
Under Moral Rights Law 
Moral rights are distinct from the rights granted under 
copyright law, which protect the copyright owner’s economic 
interests.51  Moral rights are a bundle of rights which protect the 
artist’s personal interest in preserving the artistic integrity of his 
work and in compelling recognition for his authorship, regardless 
of whether he owns the copyright in the work.52  Because moral 
rights protect the honor and reputation of the artist, moral rights 
may not be transferred from the artist to third parties.53 
The concept of moral rights originated in continental Europe 
and has been highly developed there.54  For example, in France, 
these rights are referred to as le droit moral, which roughly 
translates to rights which protect the spiritual, non-economic and 
personal aspects of an artist’s work.55  By contrast, protection of 
moral rights of artists under United States law is limited.  
Legislators and courts have been slow to adopt provisions granting 
 
 47 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2000); LATMAN, supra note 46, at 175. 
 48 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975). 
 49 See infra Part II A.3. 
 50 See infra Part II A.3. 
 51 See Kathryn A. Kelly, Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting Honor Before 
Free Speech?, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 211, 215–16 (1994). 
 52 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American 
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1985). 
 53 See Kelly, supra note 51, at 215–16. 
 54 See 3 MELVILLE B. & DAVID NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01[A] (2005) [hereinafter 
NIMMER TREATISE]. 
 55 Id. 
HAZEL 2/3/2006  10:59 AM 
2005] COPYRIGHT LAW AND UNFIXED WORKS 309 
protection for a work based on non-economic theories to persons 
who may no longer own the copyright in the work.56 
Several theories justify granting protection for moral rights.  
First, the natural law theory implies that artistic works are 
manifestations of the artist’s psyche.  The work that the artist 
creates, therefore, is his property and he has a right to control that 
property.57  Second, an artistic work is seen as an extension of the 
artist’s personality.  Thus, protection for the work is triggered 
under the individual’s right to the sanctity of his or her person 
against outside interference.58  Third, by allowing an artist to 
secure the aesthetic content of his work, the artist preserves his 
honor and reputation, and thus secures the work’s economic value.  
Injury to an artist’s reputation generally has a corresponding injury 
to the economic value of his work.59  Finally, by granting 
protection for moral rights, the interest society has in maintaining 
its cultural identity is protected through preservation of its cultural 
artifacts.60 
In distinguishing between the protections afforded under 
copyright law and moral rights law, Martin A. Roeder captured the 
essence of moral rights in his article, The Doctrine of Moral Right: 
A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators:61 
The copyright law, of course, protects the economic 
exploitation of the fruits of artistic creation; but the 
economic, exploitative aspect of the problem is only one of 
its many facets . . . . When an artist creates, be he an author, 
a painter, a sculptor, an architect or a musician, he does 
 
 56 See id. § 8D.02[A]. 
 57 See Craig A. Wagner, Motion Picture Colorization, Authenticity, and the Elusive 
Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628, 689 (1989).  Copyright law is based on the 
proprietary principle that the work is a product of intellectual labor “and [is] considered 
as much the author’s own property as the physical substance on which it was written.” 1 
PATRY, supra note 30, at 3; see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN’S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 
2 (6th ed. 1986). 
 58 See Wagner, supra note 57, at 689–90. 
 59 Id. at 690; see Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of 
Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 566 (1940). 
 60 Wagner, supra note 57, at 690. 
 61 Roeder, supra note 59. 
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more than bring into the world a unique object having only 
exploitive possibilities; he projects into the world part of 
his personality and subjects it to the ravages of public use.  
There are possibilities of injury to the creator other than 
merely economic ones; these the copyright statute does not 
protect.  Nor is the interest of society in the integrity of its 
cultural heritage protected by the copyright statute.62 
Moral rights generally include the right of disclosure, the right 
of attribution, and the right of integrity.63  The right of disclosure 
allows the artist to determine whether a work should be made 
public.64  Under this right, “[t]he artist retains the right to modify, 
destroy or hide the work . . .65 to refuse to complete a 
commissioned work . . . 66 [and to] prohibit display of work that 
[the artist] has already destroyed or discarded.”67 
The right of attribution allows the artist to have his or her 
authorship recognized in connection with a work, even if the actual 
work has been transferred to another person.68  The artist may 
require that his name, pseudonym or nom de plume be used with 
his work.69  An artist can also prohibit the use of his name on 
works he did not create.70  Thus, the artist can prevent others from 
falsely attributing works to him.71  Finally, the attribution right 
allows the artist to disclaim authorship if the work is altered to 
such an extent that it is no longer considered to be the work of the 
artist.72 
 
 62 Id. at 557. 
 63 3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.01[A]; Kelly, supra note 51, at 216; 
Nokes, supra note 16, at 639. 
 64 Kelly, supra note 51, at 216–17; Kwall, supra note 52, at 6; see Roeder, supra note 
59, at 559. 
 65 Kelly, supra note 51, at 216. 
 66 Id. at 216–17. 
 67 Kelly, supra note 51, at 217; see Roeder, supra note 59, at 559. 
 68 See 3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.03[A][1]; Kelly, supra note 51, at 
217; Roeder, supra note 59, at 561–62. 
 69 Kelly, supra note 51, at 217; Roeder, supra note 59, at 562. 
 70 See 3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.03[B][1]; Kelly, supra note 51, at 
217; Roeder, supra note 59, at 562, 563. 
 71 Roeder, supra note 59, at 562, 563; Wagner, supra note 57, at 692–93. 
 72 Kelly, supra note 51, at 217. 
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The right of integrity enables the artist to preserve his work 
even though the actual work may be in the possession of someone 
else.73  This right lies at the heart of the moral right doctrine 
because it prevents alterations that destroy the spirit and character 
of an artist’s work.74  The right of integrity allows the artist to 
prevent the work from being distorted, mutilated, modified or 
truncated.75  However, this right does not protect against 
destruction of the work.76  Once a work is destroyed completely, it 
cannot reflect adversely upon the artist’s honor and reputation.77  
Importantly, the right of integrity protects the public’s interest in 
preserving the work as the artist intended it.78 
Moral rights, particularly the right of integrity, if accepted in 
the United States, could potentially protect the artist’s interest in 
preventing the creation of an altered version of the original work, 
such as the versions created by movie-editing software in that the 
altered version likely desecrates the artist’s conception of his or her 
work. 
C.  The Story Behind the Enactment of the Family Movie Act 
The Family Movie Act was enacted to protect the interests of 
consumers who find offensive the mature content contained in 
some movies, including obscene language, sex and nudity, 
violence and immoral behavior, such as drug use.79  The Act 
exempts from copyright infringement technology which allows a 
consumer to skip or mute offensive material. 
In 1998, Sunrise Videos, a family-owned video store in Utah, 
made physically-edited versions of movies available to 
 
 73 Wagner, supra note 57, at 692. 
 74 Kwall, supra note 52, at 8; Roeder, supra note 59, at 565 (“This aspect of the moral 
right—often deemed to constitute the whole doctrine—is at once the oldest and best 
known.”). 
 75 See 3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.04[A]; Kelly, supra note 51, at 217–
18; see Kwall, supra note 52, at 10–11; Roeder, supra note 59, at 565–66, 569. 
 76 See Kelly, supra note 51, at 218–19; Roeder, supra note 59, at 569. 
 77 Kwall, supra note 52, at 9. 
 78 Kelly, supra note 51, at 219. 
 79 Benny Evangelista, House passes piracy measure; Film industry wins some, loses 
other battles in Congress, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 20, 2005, at C1. 
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consumers.80  Since then, several other businesses which sanitize 
movies have opened and have spread rapidly.81  In addition, 
software manufacturers have developed technology to allow 
consumers to self-edit DVDs they rent or purchase.  Originally, the 
altered versions were targeted at religiously-sensitive consumers.82  
Now, the targeted market has expanded to include parents who 
desire to show their children sanitized versions of produced movies 
which contain mature material.83  This industry has become known 
as the “e-rated industry”—“e” stands for “edited.”84 
Today, companies that provide sanitized films to individual 
consumers use two different methods to edit the films.  One 
method involves editing techniques that create a physically-altered 
copy.85  Generally, an edited master copy is made and then 
repeatedly copied onto either the videocassettes containing the 
original version of the movie or recordable DVDs.86  In an effort to 
avoid inflicting the economic harm against which the copyright 
laws protect, the companies using this method often purchase one 
original copy of the movie for every edited copy they make.87  
Thus, they maintain a one-to-one ratio of original-to-altered 
versions of each movie. 
A second group of companies, including ClearPlay and 
Trilogy, have created software which edits movies as you watch 
them.88  The software reads an original copy of the movie and 
skips over material or mutes words according to the movie’s 
 
 80 Mitakis, supra note 16, at 292; Nokes, supra note 16, at 611–612. 
 81 Mitakis, supra note 16, at 292.  “CleanFlicks experience fast growth to 
approximately seventy outlets in eighteen states in the Midwest and West including 
California, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, Ohio and Oregon.”  Id. 
 82 Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291–92. 
 83 Glasser, supra note 17, at 134–35; see Kerns, supra note 17, at 513. 
 84 Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291, n.2; Nokes, supra note 16, at 612. 
 85 See Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291, n.2; Nokes, supra note 16, at 616. 
 86 Nokes, supra note 16, at 618; Silvey, supra note 17, at 423–24. 
 87 Glasser, supra note 17, at 145–47, 173–74; see Mitakis, supra note 16, at 293. 
 88 Glasser, supra note 17, at 136–38. 
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timings.89  By using this software, the original copy of the movie 
remains unaltered, but the viewer experiences an altered version.90 
The mature material is categorized into three or four groups 
and each group has several settings.  This allows the user to adjust 
the settings and to select the amount of each type of material to be 
edited.  For example, ClearPlay has four categories of material 
each with multiple settings: Violence; Language; Sex and Nudity; 
and Other, which includes explicit drug use.91  Trilogy has three 
categories each with four ratings: Language; Violence; and Adult 
Themes.92  A user, therefore, can eliminate entirely the material 
under one category, such as sex and nudity, but keep all of the 
material under another category, such as profanity. 
The Family Movie Act exempts from copyright infringement 
private home viewings of movies which use software to skip 
selected audio or video content.93  The Act reads: 
[T]he making imperceptible, by or at the direction of a 
member of a private household, of limited portions of audio 
or video content of a motion picture . . .  from . . . the 
creation or provision of a computer program or other 
technology . . . if no fixed copy of the altered version of the 
motion picture is created by such computer program or 
other technology.94 
The exemption, therefore, applies only to the use of technology 
which skips or mutes audio or visual content so that the viewer 
does not experience that content95 and does not apply to physically 
 
 89 Kerns, supra note 17, at 489–92. 
 90 Glasser, supra note 17, at 138; Kerns, supra note 17, at 492; Nokes, supra note 16, at 
619; Silvey, supra note 17, at 425–26. 
 91 Nokes, supra note 16, at 621; see Kerns, supra note 17, at 490–91 (describing the 
criteria that ClearPlay’s employees to determine offensive content as “(1) blood and gore; 
(2) violence, drug use, and other crude behavior; (3) profanity; and (4) sex and nudity”). 
 92 Nokes, supra note 16, at 621–22. 
 93 Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–9, §§ 201–202, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 94 Id. at 223. 
 95 Id. 
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altered copies.96  Thus, the editing companies which provide fixed 
copies of the sanitized movie are excluded from the exemption 
provided for by Congress in the Family Movie Act.97  Therefore, 
the editing companies pose an easy target for infringement actions 
by movie studios based on violation of the reproduction and 
derivative rights because they are making a fixed copy of the 
altered work and are, therefore, not exempted from liability by 
Congress.98 
Although the Family Movie Act exempts the digital movie-
editing technology from infringement, it does not address the 
legality of unfixed, altered works in a general matter.99  Therefore, 
outside of the provisions of the Family Movie Act, the legality of 
unfixed, altered works is uncertain. 
II.  ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT STATUTORY,  
JUDICIAL AND SCHOLARLY MATERIALS 
A.  Moral, Reproduction and Derivative Rights Provisions Under 
the Copyright Act 
It is clear that physically-altered fixed movies are not exempted 
from infringement by the Family Movie Act.  However, outside of 
the exemptions provided for in the Family Movie Act, in the digital 
age, the more interesting analysis involves whether the right to 
prepare derivative works can be infringed by works which are not 
fixed. 
 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See H. R. REP. NO. 109–33(I), at 7 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 220, 225.  
In fact, the movie studios have brought claims against the editing companies for this very 
reason. See, e.g., Huntsman v. Soderbergh, Civ. Action No. 02–M–1662 (MJW) (D. Co.); 
Mitakis, supra note 16, at 294. 
 99 The Family Movie Act specifically addresses the legality of movie-editing software, 
but does not cover other examples of unfixed altered works which may arise in the future. 
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1.   Protection Against Modifications to Artistic Works Under 
Moral Rights 
The Berne Convention,100 an international convention signed 
by seventy-seven countries, governs the copyright laws of its 
signatories.101  Berne provides for protection of moral rights under 
Article 6bis, 102 which protects the right of integrity and the right of 
attribution.  The language regarding the right of integrity reads: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even 
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the 
right . . . to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, 
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation.103 
In adhering to the Berne Convention, Congress declared that 
the existing provisions under the Copyright Act, the Lanham Act 
and existing state laws were sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
under Article 6bis.104  The Copyright Act itself grants only limited 
protection for the right of integrity.105  The Act provides protection 
for this right under a section called the Visual Artists Rights Act of 
1990 (hereinafter VARA)106 but extends this protection only to 
creators of works of visual art.107  Works of visual art include 
paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and photographs.108  Audio-
visual works and works for hire—including movies—are 
 
 100 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 99–27, 1971 WL 123138 [hereinafter Berne Convention].  The United 
States adopted the Convention under the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100–568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). 
 101 4 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 17.01[B][1]. 
 102 Berne Convention, supra note 100, art. 6bis. 
 103 Id. art. 6bis(1). 
 104 2 PATRY, supra note 30, at 1275. 
 105 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2000). 
 106 Id.; see 3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.06. 
 107 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (2000). 
 108 Id. § 101. 
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specifically excluded from the provision for moral rights 
protection.109 
According to Melville B. and David Nimmers’ widely 
respected treatise on copyright law, the Congressional finding that 
United States laws are adequate to satisfy the obligations under the 
Berne Convention “flies in the face of a number of judicial and 
scholarly pronouncements on the subject.”110  Moreover, the 
judicial interpretation of the laws which might serve to protect the 
moral rights of works which fall outside of the provisions of 
VARA, has been narrow and unforgiving.111 
 
 109 Id. 
 110 3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.02[D][1].  The treatise points to John 
Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1035–36 
(1976) (“The moral right of the artist, and in particular that component called the right of 
integrity of the work of art, simply does not exist in our law.”), and Weinstein v. Univ. of 
Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1095 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[D]roit moral, the Continental principle” 
is a doctrine that “no American jurisdiction follows as a general matter.”). 
 111 The recent Supreme Court pronouncement in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003), on the right of attribution limits the 
doctrine of moral rights in general.  The Court considered a claim by Fox under the 
Lanham Act for false designation of origin based on a set of videos that Dastar had 
reworked and sold as their own.  The original video set, which had fallen into the public 
domain, was made from a television series, which was based on a book.  Fox had 
repurchased the television rights to the book.  The Court concluded that unless Dastar had 
purchased the original set of videos and repackaged them as their own, Fox could not 
claim any right of attribution.  The Court found that Congress had limited the right of 
attribution under copyright law to works of visual art.  The Court concluded that if the 
Court were to recognize “a cause of action for misrepresentation of authorship of non-
copyrighted works (visual or otherwise) . . .these limitations [would be rendered] 
superfluous.  A statutory interpretation that renders another statute superfluous is of 
course to be avoided.” 539 U.S. at 35.  Thus, the Court’s conclusion generally limits the 
doctrine of moral rights.  Although the Second Circuit had earlier recognized a cause of 
action for the right of integrity brought under the Lanham Act, Gilliam v. American 
Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that “ABC impaired the integrity of 
appellants’ work and represented to the public as the product of appellants what was 
actually a mere caricature of their talents”), Dastar may have weakened the effect of the 
Second Circuit’s ruling because the Second Circuit used the Lanham Act to provide 
protection for moral rights, rights typically associated with copyright laws.  Recent cases 
have refused to recognize a cause of action under the Lanham Act which would protect 
the artist’s right of integrity. See Bd. of Managers of Soho Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of 
New York, No. 01 Civ. 1226 (DAB), 2003 WL 21403333 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) 
(finding with respect to a right of integrity claim based on the destruction of a work of 
visual art that “Congress intended VARA to pre-empt not only state statutes and common 
law which seek to protect visual artists’ moral rights, but all of the federal remedies as 
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Without protection for moral rights for works other than works 
of visual arts, artists must rely on unfair competition law, 
trademark law, defamation, invasion of privacy, contract law and 
the derivative right under copyright law to protect their interest in 
their creations.112  However, these causes of action are imperfect in 
protecting moral rights because they require elements of proof 
which are not directly applicable to a moral rights claim.113  For 
example, unfair competition law protects economic rights and 
protects against consumer deception and thus, requires an artist to 
bring evidence that a competitor passed off the artist’s work as the 
competitor’s, and evidence of the likelihood of confusion.  Neither 
of these elements are applicable to the protection afforded under 
the doctrine of moral rights.  Any overlap between these two areas 
of law which might provide protection for the moral rights of an 
artist “merely is fortuitous.”114   
The Nimmer treatise asserts that “[o]ne cannot make an end 
run around the limitations of . . . [VARA] by reading the Copyright 
Act’s . . . [derivative] right broadly, so as to encompass any 
modification of a copyrightable work, even though it may fail to 
qualify as a work of visual art.”115  In making this assertion, the 
 
well.”); Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 934 F. Supp. 119, 
126 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(affirming the findings regarding the Lanham Act claim).  The lower court in Boosey & 
Hawkes found with respect to a right of integrity claim based on the modification of a 
musical work brought under the Lanham Act that neither the Lanham Act § 43(a) nor 
Gilliam “precludes persons from modifying or mutilating a work.” Id.  Moreover, the 
lower court found that the Lanham Act only “proscribes a person from falsely 
representing that a modification of an original work is either (1) the original work or (2) a 
work of the author of the original.” Id. 
 112 Kwall, supra note 52, at 3, 18. 
 113 Id. at 23. 
 114 Id. at 24. 
 115 3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.06[C][1].  In making this assertion, the 
treatise cites Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).  The Seventh Circuit 
considered whether A.R.T. Co. infringed Lee’s derivative right when A.R.T. Co. 
purchased some of Lee’s notecards and lithographs, mounted the works on ceramic tiles 
and resold the tiles.  The Seventh Circuit found that there was no infringement because 
A.R.T. Co.’s actions merely constituted “changing the way in which a work of art [is] 
displayed.” Lee, 125 F.3d at 581.  However, the Ninth Circuit in Mirage Editions, Inc. v. 
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988), and the District of Alaska in 
Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993), considered 
identical cases and came to a conclusion opposite to the Seventh Circuit’s.  The District 
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treatise relies on the law reflecting only one side of a circuit 
split.116  Thus, it is unclear whether this assertion is correct.  In 
fact, contrary to this assertion, the derivative right, and also the 
reproduction right, may protect against such modifications, 
depending on the quantity and quality of the modifications and 
how the altered work is used. 
2.   Protection Against Reproduction of Works  
in Substantial Part 
The reproduction right does not provide any protection against 
unfixed, altered versions of copyrighted works.  The reproduction 
right provides that “the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive 
right[] to . . . reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords.”117  The Act defines “copies” as “material 
objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or 
later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the 
aid of a machine or device.”118 
The legislative history of the Copyright Act likewise limits the 
reproduction right to “the right to produce a material object in 
which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or simulated in 
a fixed form from which it can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.’”119  To infringe the reproduction right requires 
“reproducing [the work] in whole or in any substantial part, and by 
duplicating it exactly or by imitation or simulation.”120  Thus, the 
 
of Alaska followed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, which found that A.R.T. Co. had “recast, 
transformed or adapted” the original work, creating an unauthorized derivative work in 
violation of the original owner’s copyright. Mirage Editions, 856 F.2d at 1343–44.  The 
Ninth Circuit implicitly rejected A.R.T. Co.’s argument that mounting the artwork onto 
the tiles constituted a mere change in the way the work was displayed.  See Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari To The United States Court of Appeals For the Ninth Circuit, 
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co. v. Mirage Editions, Inc., 489 U.S. 1018 (1989) (No. 88–1086). 
 116 See supra note 115 (explaining the circuit split). 
 117 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000). 
 118 Id. § 101 (emphasis added). 
 119 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 61 (1976) (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 
(1975) (emphasis added). 
 120 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 61 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975). 
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exercise of and infringement of the reproduction right are limited 
to works which are fixed in a tangible medium.121 
3.   Protection Against Altered Versions of Works  
Under the Derivative Right 
a)  The Statutory Language of the Copyright Act 
In contrast with the reproduction right, the derivative right may 
provide protection for unfixed, altered versions of copyrighted 
works.  The Copyright Act gives the owner of a copyright the 
exclusive right to “prepare” derivative works.122  It is clear that in 
order for a derivative work to be copyrightable, it must be fixed.123  
However, it is not clear whether a work must be fixed to infringe 
the derivative right of a copyright owner.124  Courts and 
commentators have analyzed the Copyright Act and the legislative 
reports to ascertain Congress’s intent on the question.  They have 
come to conflicting conclusions.  The ambiguity lies in the 
definition of “derivative work” as compared with definitions of 
other “works” under the Copyright Act and the use of the term 
“prepare” in the grant of the derivative right. 
 
 121 1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 689.  “The elements of a prima facie case of infringement 
of the reproduction right are . . . (3) unauthorized copying by the defendant.” Id.  This 
triggers the § 101 definition of “copies” which is limited to “material objects.” See 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 122 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000). 
 123 Id. § 102.  “Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated.” Id. § 102(a).  “In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” Id. § 102(b). 
 124 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976).  “[T]he [unauthorized] preparation of a 
derivative work, such as a ballet, pantomime, or improvised performance, may be an 
infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form.” Id. 
The exclusive right to prepare derivative works . . . overlaps the exclusive right 
of reproduction to some extent.  It is broader than that right, however, in the 
sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas the 
preparation of a derivative work . . . may be an infringement even though 
nothing is ever fixed in tangible form. 
Id. at 58. 
HAZEL 2/3/2006  10:59 AM 
320 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:297 
The Copyright Act does not define “work.”  Instead, it defines 
specific types of works, such as derivative works, literary works, 
and pictoral, graphic and sculptural works.125  In its definition of 
“derivative works” the Act does not reference fixation in any 
way.126  This contrasts with the definitions of other types of works 
which do reference fixation, including architectural works, 
audiovisual works, literary works, and pictoral, graphic and 
sculptural works.127  So, in the context of a derivative work, 
nothing in the word “work” seems to require it to be fixed.  For a 
derivative work to be copyrightable, it must be fixed.128  However, 
the ambiguity of the language of the statute leaves open the 
possibility that a copyrighted work may be able to be infringed by 
an unfixed work. 
The Copyright Act provides for the exclusive right to “prepare” 
rather than “create” derivative works.129  According to the 
definition of “create,” it is clear that to “create” a work, the work 
must be fixed.130  The Act gives a definition of the time at which a 
work is “created”—“when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for 
the first time.”131  A work is “fixed” when “its embodiment in a 
copy or phonorecord . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
for a period of more than transitory duration.”132  The definition of 
fixation excludes “purely evanescent or transient reproductions 
such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on 
 
 125 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id.  The Act defines an ‘architectural work’ as “the design of a building as embodied 
in any tangible medium of expression.” Id.  The Act defines ‘audiovisual works’ as 
“works that consist of a series of related images . . . regardless of the nature of the 
material objects . . . in which the works are embodied.” Id.  The Act defines ‘literary 
works’ as “works . . . expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols 
or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects . . . in which they are 
embodied.” Id.  The Act limits the definition of ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ 
to those which are “two-dimensional and three-dimensional works.” Id. 
 128 Id. § 102. 
 129 Id. §106(2). 
 130 Id. § 101. 
 131 Id. (emphasis added). 
 132 Id. 
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a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in 
the ‘memory’ of a computer.”133 
In defining the derivative rights of the author, the Act does not 
use the word “create.”  Instead, it uses the word “prepare.”  
“Prepare” is not defined and, therefore, contains no reference to 
fixation.  Thus, the exclusive right to prepare derivative works is 
less exact than the exclusive right to reproduce or distribute, both 
of which are limited to reproducing or distributing material 
objects.134  Therefore, although a derivative work must be fixed to 
be copyrighted,135 the use of the word “prepare” leaves room for 
infringement of the derivative right by unfixed works. 
b) The Legislative History of the Copyright Act 
Even if the interpretation of the word “prepare” in the 
derivative rights section of the Copyright Act was dismissed as 
distinguishing between the type of labor the author performs rather 
than distinguishing among fixed or unfixed works, or as saying 
nothing about the requirements for infringement of the derivative 
right at all, the legislative history of the derivative right indicates in 
plain language that to infringe the derivative right, the infringing 
work need not be fixed.136  The legislative history provides that for 
a work to be an infringement of the derivative right, the work 
“must be ‘based upon the copyrighted work,’” and thus “must 
incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form.”137  
However, the reports make it clear that the form in which the 
copyrighted work is incorporated need not be a material object.  
The legislative reports explain that the exclusive right to prepare 
derivative works overlaps with the exclusive right of reproduction, 
but is broader than the reproduction right in that “reproduction 
requires fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas the 
 
 133 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 53 (1976). 
 134 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2000). 
 135 Id. § 102. 
 136 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975). 
 137 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975). 
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preparation of a derivative work . . . may be an infringement even 
though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form.”138 
According to the Nimmer treatise, when the derivative right is 
infringed upon, either the reproduction right or the performance 
right is also necessarily infringed.139  This suggests that fixation is 
not required to infringe.  The performance right includes the 
exclusive right to “recite, render, play, dance, or act [the work], 
either directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case 
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images 
in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it 
audible.”140  The performance right, as compared to the display 
right, does not involve a “copy” of the work, and thus does not 
require fixation.141  In its discussion of protection of a performance 
through fixation of the performance in a recording, the House 
Report implies that a performance is unfixed.142  If the Nimmer 
treatise is correct that infringement of the derivative right 
necessarily involves either infringement of the reproduction right 
or infringement of the performance right,143 then the derivative 
right can be infringed by works which are unfixed. 
The Nimmer treatise goes on to argue, however, that because 
the same term “derivative right” is used both in the explanation of 
 
 138 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975). 
 139 2 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8.09[A]. 
 140 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 141 Id.  The display right gives the owner of the copyright the exclusive right “to show a 
copy of [the work].” Id. 
 142 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 52 (1976) (“[A]n unfixed work of authorship, such as 
an improvisation or an unrecorded choreographic work, performance or broadcast, would 
continue to be subject to protection under State common law or statute, but would not be 
eligible for Federal statutory protection under 102.”).  The recent, related controversy 
over the anti-bootlegging statutes also indicates that the performance itself is not fixed. 
See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), (holding that the 
antibootlegging statutes are unconstitutional), appeal docketed, No. 04–5649 (2d Cir. 
Oct. 26, 2004); KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. 
Cal. 2004), appeal docketed, No. 04–57077, (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2004) (holding that the 
antibootlegging statutes are unconstitutional); contra United States v. Moghadam, 175 
F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 193 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 
1999), (finding the antibootlegging statutes constitutional), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 
(2000). 
 143 2 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8.09[A]. 
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the protection afforded to derivative works144 and the scope of 
infringement,145 Congress did not intend two different meanings to 
apply to the copyrightability of derivative works and the 
infringement of derivative works.  The Nimmer treatise asserts that 
the actual language of the Act is unambiguous and, therefore, 
fixation is required both for copyrightability and for 
infringement.146  Because the language of the Act is unambiguous, 
the treatise argues, the legislative history should be ignored.147  
Finally, the treatise dismisses as dictum the Ninth Circuit’s 
findings that there exist two different standards for derivative 
works.148  The Ninth Circuit has held that for a derivative work to 
be copyrightable it must be fixed, but for a work to infringe upon 
the derivative right it need not be fixed.149 
The assertions of the Nimmer treatise seem overly simplistic.  
Contrary to those assertions, the enactment of the Family Movie 
Act indicates that Congress still believes that the derivative right—
in the specific subject matter of home-movies covered by the 
Act—may be infringed by unfixed works.150 
B.  Relevant Case Law 
Notwithstanding the statute-based arguments on either side, a 
few circuit courts have analyzed whether fixation is required for 
infringement of the derivative right.  In Lone Ranger Television, 
Inc. v. Program Radio Corporation,151 the Ninth Circuit suggested 
that there are two different standards for the copyrightability of 
derivative works and the infringement of the derivative right.  The 
same circuit followed that finding by clearly stating that fixation is 
 
 144 See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a)–(b) (2000).  This section provides protection only for 
material that that author contributed to the preexisting work and does not extend to 
preexisting material employed in the work. 
 145 See id. § 106(2). 
 146 2 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8.09[A]. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 150 Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–9, §§ 201–202, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 151 740 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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not required for infringement of the derivative right in Lewis 
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.152  The Ninth and 
Seventh Circuits both analyzed whether works which were not 
clearly fixed infringed the derivative right of the original work in 
Micro Star v. FormGen Inc.153 and Midway Manufacturing Co. v. 
Artic International, Inc., respectively.154  In these cases, as well as 
in Galoob, the circuits emphasized the importance of the 
consideration of whether the allegedly infringing work exploits a 
distinct market and whether the copyright owner has the right to 
monopolize that market. 
Moreover, before the issue of the legality of unfixed, altered 
works arose in the context of home-viewed movies, the very same 
issue arose in the context of video games.  The video game 
technological innovations work in a strikingly similar manner as 
the movie-editing technology.  The allegedly infringing altered 
video games were created by technology used in conjunction with 
the original video game.  Thus, the altered versions of the games 
were created through a synthesis of the original game and the 
instructions contained in the technology.  In Galoob, the user 
inserted a card in between an original game cartridge and the video 
game system.155  This allowed the user to change up to three 
features of the game, such as the number of lives of the character, 
or the speed at which the character moved.156  In Midway, the 
defendant substituted a circuit board in the original game which 
increased the speed of the game, making it a much more exciting 
game.157 
In Lone Ranger,158 the defendant bought reel-to-reel copies of 
Lone Ranger episode production tapes from some collectors and 
re-mixed the recordings onto broadcast cartridges for radio 
broadcasts.159  The Ninth Circuit found that the contribution of the 
 
 152 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 153 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 154 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 155 Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Midway, 704 F.2d at 1010. 
 158 Lone Ranger Television v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 159 Id. at 720. 
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independent expression by the actors, together with the 
contribution of the independent expression by the special 
production methods of taping and editing for radio, created a new 
work for a different market.160  Importantly, the court found that 
“[i]t makes no difference that the derivation may not satisfy certain 
requirements for statutory copyright registration itself.”161  In this 
case, infringement of the derivative right was by a fixed product.  
However, the Lone Ranger decision suggests the existence of 
different standards for copyrightability (fixed) as opposed to the 
infringement (unfixed) of derivative works.  This lends support to 
the notion that the derivative right of a copyrighted work may be 
infringed by works which are not copyrightable because they are 
not fixed.162  If infringing works were held to a different standard 
and the statements in the legislative reports indicating that a work 
does not have to be fixed to infringe the derivative right were taken 
at face value, then the unfixed, altered works created by the editing 
technology may infringe the derivative right. 
In Galoob, the Ninth Circuit addressed head-on the question of 
whether fixation is required for infringement of the derivative 
right.163  Nintendo sold video games and video game systems.164  
The games were contained on cartridges which were inserted into 
the Nintendo game systems.165  Galoob produced the Game Genie, 
which was used in conjunction with Nintendo games.166  The 
Game Genie altered up to three features of the game by blocking 
the value for a single data byte sent by the game cartridge to the 
system and replacing it with a new value.167  For example, a player 
could (1) increase the number of lives of his character, (2) increase 
the speed at which his character moved, and (3) choose to give his 
character the ability to float above obstacles.168  The Game Genie 
 
 160 Id. at 721. 
 161 Id. at 722. 
 162 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
 163 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 164 Id. at 967. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
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did not alter the data that was stored in the cartridge.169  Instead, 
the Game Genie was inserted between a cartridge and the 
system.170  The Ninth Circuit followed Lone Ranger in its 
conclusion that a derivative work must be fixed to be protected 
under the Act, but does not have to be fixed to infringe a 
copyrighted work.171  Thus, an unfixed, altered version of a 
copyrighted work could potentially infringe the derivative right of 
the original work. 
However, after making this finding, the Ninth Circuit then 
reinserted the requirement of fixation to infringe the derivative 
right by requiring that the audiovisual displays enhanced by the 
Game Genie incorporate the original work in “some concrete or 
permanent form.”172  Galoob looked to the list of examples of 
derivative works provided in the Act for support for the 
requirement that the derivative work physically incorporate the 
underlying work.173  The Galoob court concluded that because the 
altered displays were not embodied in a concrete or permanent 
form, the Game Genie did not create a derivative work—the 
modified game took place only once as it was being played—and 
therefore did not infringe upon Nintendo’s exclusive right to 
prepare derivative works.174  The court then analyzed the Game 
Genie under the fair-use doctrine and found that because the Game 
Genie did not detract from Nintendo’s market175 and because it 
was used privately,176 it fell within the fair-use defense.177  This 
case has resulted in much confusion because its requirement that a 
work be fixed to infringe the derivative right contradicts its 
pronouncement that infringement of the derivative right does not 
require fixation. 
 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 968 (emphasis in original); see Lone Ranger Television v. Program Radio 
Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 722 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 172 Galoob, 964 F.2d at 968 (emphasis in original omitted). 
 173 Id. at 967. 
 174 Id. at 969. 
 175 Id. at 971. 
 176 Id. at 970. 
 177 Id. at 972. 
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The Ninth Circuit returned to the question of whether fixation 
was necessary for infringement of the derivative right in 
FormGen.178  FormGen produced a computer game, Duke Nukem 
3D.179  The game consisted of three separate components: the 
game engine, the source art library, and the MAP files.180  The 
MAP files contained instructions which directed the game engine 
to place particular images in specific places.181  The engine 
accessed the source art library, selected the images and positioned 
them appropriately on the display.182  The MAP files described the 
levels of the game in great detail, but did not contain the 
copyrighted art.183  The art was in the source art library.184  With 
FormGen’s encouragement, players created new levels for the 
game and posted them on the internet for others to download.185  
Micro Star then downloaded 300 user-created levels, burned them 
onto a CD, and sold the CDs commercially as Nuke It.186 
The Nuke It CD contained MAP files.187  When using the CD, 
the MAP files instructed the game engine to access its own source 
art library for the images necessary for the displays.188  The Ninth 
Circuit followed its earlier pronouncement in Galoob that to 
infringe upon the derivative right of the original work, the 
derivative work must incorporate the original work in a concrete or 
permanent form.189  To distinguish Micro Star’s MAP files from 
The Game Genie in Galoob, the FormGen court described The 
Game Genie as a passive interface: “it functioned only as a 
window into a computer program, allowing players to temporarily 
modify individual aspects of the game.”190  When the game was 
 
 178 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 179 Id. at 1109. 
 180 Id. at 1110.  MAP files are “[s]o-called because the files all end with the extension 
‘.MAP.’” Id. at 1110 n.2. 
 181 Id. at 1110. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 1109. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 1112. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 1110. 
 190 Id. at 1111. 
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over, the unfixed derivative work was gone and could only be 
reconstructed if the player decided to reenter the same codes.191 
In contrast with the findings regarding The Game Genie, the 
FormGen court found that the audiovisual displays generated by 
Duke Nukem 3D were in the MAP files of Micro Star’s Nuke It 
CD.192  The FormGen court compared the audiovisual displays 
described by the Nuke It CD to the notations describing 
pantomimes and dances, which could be “described in sufficient 
detail to enable the work to be performed from that description.”193  
Although the Nuke It CD did not contain the source art itself, it 
infringed FormGen’s right to create sequels to its game.194  The 
stories of the sequels were contained in Nuke It’s MAP files which 
“[told] new . . . tales of Duke’s fabulous adventures.”195  In 
dismissing Micro Star’s fair-use defense, the court noted that 
Micro Star’s sales of Nuke It “‘impinged on [FormGen’s] ability to 
market new versions of the [Duke Nukem 3D] story.’  Only 
FormGen has the right to enter that market; whether it chooses to 
do so is entirely its business.”196  This decision strengthens a 
copyright owner’s derivative right by emphasizing the importance 
of protection of the right to exploit markets distinct from the 
market originally entered. 
In Midway,197 a 1982 decision, the Seventh Circuit established 
that altered forms of copyrighted works which serve a new market 
constitute derivative works.  Midway manufactured video game 
machines, which used circuit boards to create the images that 
appeared on the screen.198  Artic sold two circuit boards for use 
inside Midway’s video game machines.199  One board speeded-up 
 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 1112 (quoting 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 168 
(1994)). 
 194 Id. at 1113. 
 195 Id. at 1112. 
 196 Id. at 1113. 
 197 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 198 Id. at 1010. 
 199 Id. 
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the rate of play for Midway’s game “Galaxian.”200  The other 
board stored a set of images and sounds almost identical to that 
stored in Midway’s game “Pac-Man.”201  The Seventh Circuit 
found that the “speeded-up” version of the games were derivative 
works.202  The speeded-up game was more challenging and more 
exciting.203  Because the speeded-up games ended sooner, they 
also had the potential for greater revenues if players were willing 
to pay the additional price-per-minute.204  The court concluded that 
the owner of the copyright should be entitled to monopolize the 
speeded-up version of the game on the same theory that he was 
entitled to monopolize the derivative works listed in § 101.205  This 
conclusion was echoed by the Ninth Circuit in FormGen.206  
Midway, like FormGen, carves the markets narrowly and allows a 
finding that the allegedly infringing use exploits a distinct market.  
Such a finding strengthens the copyright owner’s derivative right. 
C. Defenses to the Claim of Infringement of the Derivative Right 
Defendants to allegations of copyright infringement have two 
affirmative defenses available to them, the idea-expression 
dichotomy207 and the fair-use defense.208  These defenses prevent 
facts and ideas from being monopolized by copyright owners and 
protect the criticism and the ordinary use of copyrighted works. 
These defenses also serve to protect First Amendment interests, 
which, on some level, inherently conflict with the purposes of 
copyright law.  By protecting ideas and facts from being 
copyrighted, they are free for use by subsequent authors in their 
own self-expression, democratic dialogue or protest.209  By 
 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 1010–11. 
 202 Id. at 1013–14. 
 203 Id. at 1013. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at 1014. 
 206 Micro Star v. FormGen, 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 207 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 208 See id. § 107. 
 209 The First Amendment is justified on three bases:  (1) free speech is a necessary 
concomitant of a self-governing, or democratic, society because “freedom to think as you 
will and to speak as you think are indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
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protecting the ordinary use of copyrighted works and the comment 
upon or criticism of those works, learning and creation can 
progress.210  Thus, these defenses protect the First Amendment 
interests of freedom of speech and the furtherance of knowledge.211 
 
truth,” (2) free speech is important as an end in itself “because the very nature of man is 
such that he can realize self-fulfillment only if he is free to express himself,” (3) free 
speech is necessary because “men are less inclined to resort to violence to achieve given 
ends if they are free to pursue such ends through meaningful, non-violent forms of 
expression.” Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment 
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1187–88 (1970) 
[hereinafter Nimmer Article].  By protecting ideas and facts from being copyrighted, the 
most important objective of the freedom of speech, “the maintenance of democratic 
dialogue,” is protected because “[i]t is exposure to ideas, and not to their particular 
expression, that is vital if self-governing people are to make informed decisions.” Id. at 
1191.  The limitations imposed on free speech by copyright law do not effect the second 
two bases for free speech: self-fulfillment likely does not require copying of other 
people’s expression; violence is not likely to be inflamed because one person is not 
allowed to copy the expression of another. Id. at 1192.  Because it is the dissemination of 
ideas that is important to reducing violence and to self-fulfillment, the idea-expression 
dichotomy is justified by “the public interest that ideas be liberated from all monopoly 
constraint.” Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 
1056 (1970) [hereinafter Goldstein First Amendment Article].  The idea-expression 
dichotomy strikes “a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the 
Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an 
author’s expression.” Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
556 (1985) (quoting the lower court, 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
 210 “[A] prohibition of [reasonable use of an author’s copyrighted works] would inhibit 
subsequent writers from attempting to improve upon prior works and thus . . . frustrate 
the very ends sought to be attained,” the promotion of the progress of science and the 
useful arts. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 (quoting H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND 
LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). 
 211 Some scholars believe that copyright law should revert to its unfair competition law 
roots. See Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 38–
39 (1987); 1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 32.  These scholars believe that the expansion of 
copyrightable subject matter, the expansion of the scope of rights and the extension of the 
duration of protection of the copyright create a regime that is incompatible with free 
speech, Michael Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-up and 
Breaking-up, 43 IDEA 233, 290 (2003), because the expansion of these rights bring 
ordinary uses of copyrighted works within the realm of infringement and thus constrains 
learning through the dissemination of information. See Patterson, supra, at 37–39, 44.  
Moreover, these scholars believe that the expansion of copyright law goes hand-in-hand 
with the current, proprietary notion of copyright law which improperly diverges from the 
Act’s regulatory nature. Patterson, supra, at 62.  However, the copyright law of the 
United States, rooted in English copyright law, 1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 3; PATRY, 
supra note 57, at 2, is based on the proprietary principle that the work is a product of 
intellectual labor “and [is] considered as much the author’s own property as the physical 
substance on which it was written.” 1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 3; PATRY, supra note 57, 
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1.   Idea-Expression Dichotomy 
The idea-expression dichotomy excludes from copyright 
protection “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form 
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.”212  This ensures that the constitutional goal of “promoting 
the progress of science”213 is achieved by both protecting the 
author’s expression, which encourages the investment in creation 
of works, and by allowing the ideas and facts upon which the work 
is based to remain free for subsequent authors to use.214  This 
defense does not allow authors to copy another’s expression of an 
idea but does allow an author to use the ideas of and the facts used 
by another author. 
2.   Fair Use Doctrine 
The fair-use doctrine gives “a privilege in others than the 
owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a 
reasonable manner without [the owner’s] consent.”215  Ordinary 
use of a copyrighted work for many consumers involves (1) the use 
of the work for commentary, educational, political and industrial 
uses, or (2) the use of the ideas and facts of a work by subsequent 
authors.216  This allows both learning and creation to progress.  
The Supreme Court stated that: 
 
at 2.  To characterize the Copyright Act as a regulatory machine whose purpose is merely 
dissemination of works, seems to recognize only the superficial result of the Act’s 
existence.  If copyright law is limited to protecting distribution and is relegated to simply 
being a regime of pure misappropriation law, much of the scope of rights granted to the 
author would have to be stricken.  Only the reproduction right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), and 
the distribution right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), are within the concept of a misappropriation 
regime of copyright law.  However, the rights which protect works beyond pure 
misappropriation have not been carved out surreptitiously.  They are the product of much 
reflection by the courts upon the incentive structure behind copyright law, the purpose of 
copyright law and the First Amendment. 2 PATRY, supra note 30, at 820–21. 
 212 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 213 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 214 1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 319. 
 215 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting 
H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). 
 216 1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 718–26. 
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[the] author’s consent to a reasonable use of his 
copyrighted works . . . [is] implied by the courts as a 
necessary incident of the constitutional policy of promoting 
the progress of science and the useful arts, since a 
prohibition of such use would inhibit subsequent writers 
from attempting to improve upon prior works and thus . . . 
frustrate the very ends sought to be attained.217 
Thus, the standard of fair use is whether a reasonable copyright 
owner would have consented to the use.218  The doctrine, therefore, 
allows “copying by others which does not materially impair the 
marketability of the work which is copied.”219  Professor Nimmer 
summed up the nature of First Amendment rights protected by the 
fair-use doctrine as they relate to copyrighted expression: 
[W]hile public enlightenment may require the copying of 
ideas from others, it remains perfectly possible for the 
speaker (or writer) who copies ideas from another, to 
supply his own expression of such ideas. . . . There can be 
no first amendment justification for the copying of 
expression along with idea simply because the copier lacks 
either the will or the time or energy to create his own 
independently evolved expression.  The first amendment 
guarantees the right to speak; it does not offer . . . a subsidy 
at the expense of authors whose well-being is also a matter 
of public interest.220 
The fair-use doctrine was developed in the common law.221  
The three factors which encapsulate the common law conception 
of the fair-use defense were outlined as early as 1841 in Folsom v. 
Marsh.222  Folsom stated that in considering the fair-use defense, a 
 
 217 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 (quoting H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND 
LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).  “Sanction of the fair use defense . . . recognizes the 
alleged infringer’s standing to assert [the] public interest [in access to didactic 
expression].” Goldstein First Amendment Article, supra note 209, at 1056. 
 218 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550. 
 219 Nimmer Article, supra note 209, at 1200–01. 
 220 Id. at 1203. 
 221 1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 718. 
 222 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
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court must consider “the nature and objects of the selections made, 
the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in 
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work.”223  Today, this 
doctrine is comprised of four factors and is codified in the 
Copyright Act.  The Act reads: 
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords . . . for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, 
or research, is not an infringement of copyright.  In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered 
shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a 
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon 
consideration of all the above factors.224 
The fair-use doctrine is meant to permit and require courts “to 
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, 
it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to 
foster.”225  All four factors must “be explored and the results 
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”226  Thus, 
the defense must be considered on a case-by-case basis.227  The 
fair-use doctrine allows consumers to use copyrighted works in an 
 
 223 Id. at 348. 
 224 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 225 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 226 Id. at 578. 
 227 Id. at 577. 
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ordinary fashion without encroaching upon the copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights. 
D. The Incentive Structure of the Copyright Act 
The Copyright Act is intended to give authors an incentive to 
create by giving them a limited monopoly on the rights to their 
works.  In return for this limited monopoly, the public receives a 
benefit from the authors’ creations when the works enter the public 
domain after the copyright expires.228  Thus, the monopoly created 
by copyright “rewards the individual author in order to benefit the 
public.”229 
The reproduction right, in connection with the distribution 
right, and the derivative right provide distinct incentives to create.  
The exclusive right to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted 
work gives the author the incentive to exploit his work through 
dissemination.230  On the other hand, the derivative right gives 
authors the incentive to add something to the original work231 that 
gives it “new expression, meaning, or message”232 so that it can 
qualify for copyright protection on its own and provide further 
profit to the author from his original work.233  In giving the 
original work “new expression, meaning or message,”234 a 
derivative work exists at the “point at which the contribution of 
 
 228 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985). 
[This] limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be 
achieved.  It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to 
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has 
expired. 
Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984)). 
 229 Id. at 546. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
477 (1984)). 
 230 Patterson, supra note 211, at 7.  “If copyright encourages creation, it does so only for 
the purpose of profit.  Profit, however, cannot be obtained without distribution.” Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994). 
 233 Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209 (1983) [hereinafter Goldstein Derivative Rights Article]. 
 234 Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. at 579. 
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independent expression to an existing work effectively creates a 
new work for a different market.”235  Professor Paul Goldstein 
summarized the difference in the economic incentives that arise 
from the two exclusive rights: 
Indifference to copyright economics has . . . occasionally 
produced improper curbs on derivative rights, most notably 
in cases perceived to involve utilitarian uses and fair uses 
of underlying works.  The mistake in both contexts stems 
from a failure to distinguish between derivative rights and 
reproduction rights, and to recognize that the investment 
effects of section 106(2)’s exclusive right to prepare 
derivative works differ markedly from the investment 
effects of section 106(1)’s exclusive right to reproduce 
copies.   
 Derivative rights affect the level of investment in 
copyrighted works by enabling the copyright owner to 
proportion its investment to the level of expected returns 
from all markets, not just the market in which the work first 
appears, as is generally the case with reproduction 
rights. . . .  
 Derivative rights . . . affect the direction of investment in 
copyrighted works. . . . The [author] may . . . seek returns 
in other derivative markets, or only in the original 
market. . . . [B]y securing exclusive rights to all derivative 
markets, the statute enables the copyright proprietor to 
select those toward which it will direct investment.236 
Consideration of the incentive structure of the Copyright Act 
becomes particularly important in properly applying the fair-use 
doctrine to allegedly infringing derivative works.  Historically, the 
fair-use doctrine was used in cases involving exact copies of 
copyrighted works which directly competed with the original.237  
As the scope of rights granted to the copyright owner has 
expanded, the last factor of the fair-use doctrine, “the effect of the 
 
 235 Goldstein Derivative Rights Article, supra note 233. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
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use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work,”238 has become the most important239 and problematic 
factor,240 particularly with regards to derivative rights.241 
The importance of this factor is demonstrated by the holdings 
of courts which find that it does not matter if the copyright owner 
has exploited the derivative markets.  Instead, what is important is 
whether his ability to exploit those markets is harmed.242  Professor 
Goldstein asserts that: 
courts have given the term ‘potential’ a far narrower 
construction than is appropriate in light of the Copyright 
Act’s expansive grant of derivative rights. . . . [T]he Act 
gives the author of a novel exclusive rights not only to the 
market for hardcover sales, but also to paperback sales, 
magazine serialization or condensation, and motion picture 
and television productions. . . . Any one of these markets, 
and certainly all together, can yield far greater returns to 
the copyright owner than the sales in the hardcover market 
alone.  Yet, courts applying the potential market factor 
have generally inclined to identify potential markets with 
the market in which the work was first introduced or, at 
most, with closely bordering markets.243 
The identification of ‘potential’ markets that the copyrighted 
work may enter is crucial in cases involving derivative rights, 
which, by definition, secure markets at some remove from the 
market first entered.244  Concern for the incentive structure of the 
Copyright Act lends weight to the serious consideration of 
Congress’s statements that unfixed works may infringe the 
derivative right. 
 
 238 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
 239 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
 240 PATRY, supra note 57, at 250. 
 241 Goldstein Derivative Rights Article, supra note 233. 
 242 See Micro Star v. FormGen, 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1984); Pacific & 
Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1497 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 243 Goldstein Derivative Rights Article, supra note 233. 
 244 Id. 
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III.  APPLICATION OF LAWS AND POLICY TO THE  
ISSUE OF WHETHER FIXATION IS REQUIRED  
TO INFRINGE THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT 
Today, digital technology allows works to be altered without 
ever creating a fixed version of the altered form.  Digital 
technology allows these unfixed, altered works to be recreated in 
an identical fashion infinitely.  Thus far, the courts have required 
that works be fixed to infringe the derivative right.  However, the 
capabilities of digital technology challenge this requirement. 
A. Moral Rights Will Not Provide Relief to the Movie Studios 
First, it is worth noting that if moral rights were recognized for 
audio-visual works under United States law, the modifications 
made to the original work using the sanitizing technology would 
likely not infringe upon the movie studios’ moral rights.  It would 
be difficult to argue under the prevailing legal standards that the 
modifications constitute deforming or mutilating changes to the 
movies.245  Alterations that can “prejudice an artist’s honor or 
reputation are generally limited to those changes which are 
considered “deforming” or “mutilating.”246  United States courts 
typically require drastic revisions to be made to works before they 
grant remedies for violation of the integrity right.247  In Saving 
 
 245 Cort v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Cos., 311 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 246 Berrios Nogueras v. Home Depot, 330 F. Supp. 2d 48, 50–51 (D.P.R. 2004); Flack v. 
Friends of Queen Catherine, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 247 See Flack, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (finding that the right of integrity under VARA 
was violated by the grossly negligent restoration of a sculpture which resulted in a 
“distorted, mutilated” work); Gilliam v. American Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 
1976) (enjoining ABC from broadcasting a version of the Monty Python show in which 
twenty-four of the ninety minutes had been cut); Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 
49 Misc. 2d 363, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966), aff’d, 25 A.D.2d 830, 
269 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep’t 1966), aff’d, 18 N.Y.2d 659, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966) 
(denying injunctive relief where minor cuts were made to the motion picture in television 
broadcast of movie in order to insert commercials); Autry v. Republic Prods., 213 F.2d 
667 (9th Cir. 1954) (enjoining the producer from cutting movies in which Autry appeared 
to fifty-three minutes so that they could be shown in a one hour slot on television with 
commercial breaks); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109–33(I), at 7 (2005), reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 220, 225–26 (asserting that the alterations made by the editing technology 
HAZEL 2/3/2006  10:59 AM 
338 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:297 
Private Ryan although the edits likely eliminate what makes the 
movie remarkable, the plot and characters remain intact.  It is 
likely a court would find that the revisions are not sufficiently 
drastic to constitute a violation of the studios’ moral rights.  In fact, 
the editing companies create software for only those movies where 
the essence of the movie is not destroyed by the material skipped 
or muted.248  Although moral rights may not be of use to the 
particular alterations made by the movie-editing technology, 
alterations made to copyrighted works in the future may be 
substantial enough to warrant protection of the copyrighted work 
under the right of integrity. 
B.  The Unfixed, Altered Works Do Not Constitute a Violation of 
the Reproduction Right 
Second, it is also worth noting that, in the case of the altered 
works created by editing software, if the altered works were fixed, 
the works would likely constitute a violation of the reproduction 
right.249  The reproduction right is violated when the work is 
reproduced in whole or in substantial part.250  The altered works 
are reproductions of the films in substantial part.251  In addition, 
because the software intends to produce the original as completely 
as possible and does not intend to create a new, transformative 
work, liability for violation of the reproduction right cannot be 
escaped by an argument that the altered version merely uses the 
ideas of the original work and infuses those ideas with “new 
expression, meaning, or message.”252  Ultimately, though, the 
reproduction right unequivocally requires that the allegedly 
infringing work be fixed in a tangible medium.253  Thus, relief 
would be denied to the movie studios for violation of the 
 
did not impact the moral rights of the studios any more than standard alterations made to 
movies). 
 248 Vosepka, supra note 22. 
 249 H.R. REP. NO. 109–33(I), at 7, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 220, 225 (2005).  
“The Committee is aware of services and companies that create fixed derivative copies of 
motion pictures and believes that such practices are illegal under the Copyright Act.” Id. 
 250 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 61 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975). 
 251 Mitakis, supra note 16, at 300; Nokes, supra note 16, at 611–14. 
 252 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 253 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 61–62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975). 
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reproduction right by the versions altered by use of the editing 
software. 
C. Unfixed, Altered Works May Infringe the Movie Studios’ 
Derivative Rights 
1.   The Idea-Expression Dichotomy Does Not Assist in 
Avoiding Liability for Infringement 
An application of the idea-expression dichotomy254 to the 
altered versions of the movies would not excuse the software 
companies from liability.  In producing unfixed, altered versions of 
existing works, the software reworks only the expression of the 
original author, not the ideas of the author.  Nothing new is added 
to the public collection of ideas and expression by these altered 
works.  Although the altered versions of the movies do reach a new 
group of consumers, the movies are new to this market, not 
because the consumers previously did not have access to the films, 
but because they deliberately chose255 not to expose themselves to 
the movies due to their mature content. 
 
 254 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2000). 
 255 This is in distinction from Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417 (1984).  Sony involved a claim of contributory and vicarious infringement of the 
reproduction rights of several movie studios by Sony, a maker of videocassette recorders 
(VCRs), through Sony’s consumers that recorded the studios’ copyrighted films when 
they were broadcast on network television.  The Sony Court found influential that the 
VCRs increased access to the television network programming through “‘time-
shifting’—the practice of recording a program to view it once at a later time, and 
thereafter erasing it,” id. at 423, and thus served the recognized societal interest. Id. at 
454.  The Sony Court relied on Community Television of S. California v. Gottfried, 459 
U.S. 498, 508 n.12 (1983), for its recognition of the societal interest in increasing access 
to network television programming. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454.  In the case of the editing 
software, although the sanitizing practice targets a distinct market, it does not actually 
increase access to the movie, because the market targeted is a market that chose not to 
view the movies unaltered rather than a market that was unable to view the movies 
unaltered. 
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2.   Ultimately, the Fair Use Defense Does Not Protect Against 
Liability for Infringement 
Instead, the unfixed, altered versions of the original movies 
must be analyzed as an infringement of the derivative right256 of 
the original works.  According to the language of the Act, the right 
to prepare derivative works includes the right to adapt a work.257  
The altered versions of the films likely constitute an adaptation of 
the film because the films are adapted for a unique audience—
those who are religiously sensitive and those who are children.  
Assuming for the moment that an unfixed, altered work can 
constitute a violation of the derivative right, the altered versions 
must be analyzed under the fair-use doctrine.258 
The first factor of the analysis, the purpose and character of the 
use,259 considers three aspects of the allegedly infringing work: (i) 
whether the work is being used for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; (ii) 
how transformative the new work is; and (iii) whether the use of 
the work is commercial.260  First, the primary use of the original 
works by the editing companies is not for purposes of criticism, 
commentary, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, research, self-
expression or the reduction of violence.261  The primary use of the 
original works is to profit from exploitation of a distinct market.262  
Therefore, the copyrighted work is not being used for purposes 
which are at the core of First Amendment protection. 
Second, the altered versions of the movies are not 
transformative.  The altered versions do not have a “new 
expression, meaning, or message.”263  Although a specific standard 
of morality is inserted into the movies, the software does not create 
 
 256 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000). 
 257 Id. § 101. 
 258 Id. § 107. 
 259 Id. § 107(1). 
 260 See id. § 107; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994). 
 261 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see supra note 209. 
 262 Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291. 
 263 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579. 
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a different and truly “moral” version of the story that might qualify 
as transformative.  Instead, the software merely creates a non-
offensive version of the original for the consumer.264  The purpose 
of using the editing software is not to create a new work, but is to 
experience the original as wholly as possible without viewing the 
offensive content.265  Moreover, the use of almost the entire film in 
the altered version reveals a “dearth of transformative character or 
purpose.”266  Therefore, the purposes of copyright law are not 
served by the altered versions of the movies because the altered 
work adds little to the stash of creative works in society.267 
Third, although the purpose of the use of the original films by 
the software companies is commercial—to serve a niche in the at-
home movie-viewing market268—the purpose of the use of the 
altered films by consumers is at-home use, a noncommercial use.  
In a contributory infringement action, the type of action that would 
likely be brought against the software companies, the 
noncommercial nature of the use by the consumer would be the 
focus of the court’s inquiry.  In total, it is unclear which way the 
first factor would swing.  The central purpose of the fair-use 
defense is to determine whether the new work merely 
“supersede[s] the object[]”269 of the original creation.  If the altered 
version were considered to replace the original, the first factor may 
weigh somewhat in favor of the movie studios.  However, if the 
altered version were instead viewed as either targeting a distinct 
market or increasing the profits of the original, the first factor 
would tend to weigh in favor of the technology companies. 
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,270 
considers how close to the core of intended copyright protection 
the original work falls.  When a work is at the core of the purpose 
 
 264 Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291. 
 265 See id. at 300; Nokes, supra note 16, at 611–14. 
 266 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587. 
 267 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985).  
“[C]opyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge.” Id. 
 268 Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291. 
 269 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. 
 270 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000). 
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of the Act, it is harder to justify the fair use of that work.271  The 
copyrighted works which are altered fall within the core of the 
works intended to be protected by copyright law.  Thus, the second 
factor weighs heavily against the software companies. 
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,272 also weighs 
heavily against the software companies, because the original works 
are used nearly in their entirety.273  The edited portions are, 
arguably, mere fringe in comparison to the essential elements of 
the movie, i.e., the storyline and the characters.  Therefore, not 
only do the altered versions use almost the entire copyrighted 
work, but they use the parts that are of the most value to the work. 
Analysis of the fourth factor, the effect on the potential market 
or value of the work,274 requires the most sensitive analysis of the 
four factors.  Where “a substantial portion of the infringing work 
[is] copied verbatim” from the copyrighted work, there may be a 
greater likelihood of market harm because the altered work may 
tend to supersede the need for the original work.275  However, 
because the consumer must buy or rent the original DVD to use the 
editing software,276 the effect on the original market may actually 
be to increase sales of the original movies, since consumers 
reluctant to view it with objectionable content might now rent or 
buy the DVD to view an edited version. 
Nevertheless, a second aspect of the analysis under the fourth 
factor is the consideration of the effect on the derivative markets 
for the original work.277  The market at which the altered versions 
are targeted is distinct: it consists of religiously-sensitive 
viewers278 and parents of children who wish to view movies with 
 
 271 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586. 
 272 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000). 
 273 Mitakis, supra note 16, at 300; Nokes, supra note 16, at 611–14. 
 274 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
 275 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587–88. 
 276 Kerns, supra note 17, at 489–90; Mitakis, supra note 16, at 294; Nokes, supra note 
16, at 619–21. 
 277 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 568 (1985). 
 278 Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291–92. 
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their children with the mature material edited.279  These viewers 
desire to watch movies containing mature material primarily, if not 
exclusively, in an altered form, as indicated by the popularity of 
the e-rated industry.280  Although movie studios work with airlines 
and television networks to develop sanitized versions for use by 
airlines and television networks, only one studio has thus far 
entered the market for sanitized movies for home viewing.281 
The individuals of the targeted market either become new 
purchasers of copies of the original movie, or put their already-
purchased copies of the original movie to new use.  The new 
purchasers potentially increase the market for the original DVD.  
Those who put existing copies to new use might include parents 
who have viewed a movie without their children, who then, after 
purchasing the technology and downloading the software for the 
movie, view the sanitized version of the movie with their children. 
Movie studios rely enormously on the home-viewing market to 
stay financially afloat.282  In 2004, the six major movie studios, 
Disney, Fox, Warner Brothers, Paramount, Universal and Sony, 
had total revenues of $7.4 billion from world-wide box-office 
sales, $20.9 billion from world-wide video and DVD sales, and 
 
 279 Glasser, supra note 17, at 134–35; Kerns, supra note 17, at 513. 
 280 Mitakis, supra note 16, at 292.  “CleanFlicks experienced fast growth to 
approximately seventy stores in eighteen states in the Midwest and West including 
California, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, Ohio and Oregon.” Id. 
 281 See Glasser, supra note 17, at 176; Mitakis, supra note 16, at 293; Nokes, supra note 
16, at 615–16.  Studios have collaborated with airlines and television networks to 
produce versions of films that are appropriate for audiences that might include children.  
Warner Brothers’ studio, New Line Cinema, has agreed to endorse the Dove Foundation 
of Michigan’s edited versions of the studio’s films to be marketed in Target and Wal-
Mart stores.  The Dove Foundation is “a media watchdog group with ties to Christian 
publishing.” Nokes, supra note 16, at 616; see Aguilar, supra note 18 (reporting that 
studios have worked with television networks and airlines to produce sanitized movies); 
Dan Luzadder, CleanFlicks Offers Videos Free of Sex, Swearing, DENVER POST, Dec. 28, 
2001, at A1 (stating that the Dove Foundation of Michigan announced an agreement that 
Warner Brothers will endorse Dove’s sanitized versions of movies made by Warner 
Brothers). 
 282 OLIGOPOLY WATCH: THE LATEST MANEUVERS OF THE NEW OLIGOPOLIES AND WHAT 
THEY MEAN, INDUSTRY BRIEF: MOVIES I, Aug. 6, 2003, 
http://www.oligopolywatch.com/2003/08/06.html (last visited September 21, 2005) 
[hereinafter OLIGOPOLY WATCH]; David D. Kirkpatrick, Action-Hungry DVD Fans Sway 
Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2003, at 1. 
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$17.7 billion from world-wide television licensing.283  In 
comparison with the time before television and video-cassette 
recorders when studios relied heavily on box-office sales,284 today, 
the aftermarkets are critical to the financial health of the movie 
studios, rather than merely incidental to their earnings.285  The 
earnings from DVD sales and television licensing have caused 
movie studios to rethink their strategy in promoting and releasing 
their films.286  As a result, the lag between cinematic releases and 
releases on home video and DVD and licenses to television 
networks has shortened from six months to as little as two 
months.287  The shortened window allows studios to capture a 
bigger share of the DVD market and to reduce the amount they 
spend on marketing, one of their biggest expenses.288  Therefore, 
accelerated DVD launches create greater profits and reduce 
expenses. 
Moreover, between 1989 and 2003, according to the Dove 
Foundation, the average G-rated film produced $79 million in 
profits, which is 11 times greater than the profits earned by the 
average R-rated film, which earned $7 million per film.289  During 
the same time span, G-rated films produced three times the rate of 
return on investment than R-rated films generated.290  G-rated 
films also produced higher net profit per film and video revenue 
per film than R-rated films.291  A comparison of the profits from 
PG-rated films and PG-13-rated films during the same period 
 
 283 Edward Jay Epstein, Hollywood’s Profits, Demystified: The Real El Dorado is TV, 
SLATE, Aug. 8, 2005, http://slate.msn.com/id/2124078/?nav=ais. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Kirkpatrick, supra note 282; Sharon Waxman, Swelling Demand for Disks Alters 
Hollywood’s Arithmetic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at E1; OLIGOPOLY WATCH, supra 
note 282. 
 286 Joshua Chaffin, Hollywood Is Facing a Journey Into the Unknown, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 
10, 2005, at 17; OLIGOPOLY WATCH, supra note 282. 
 287 Chaffin, supra note 286. 
 288 Id. 
 289 For Movies, G is for Gold: Study Says Movies Rated Suitable for General Audiences 
Are Far More Profitable Than More Adult Fare, CNNMONEY, June 7, 2005, 
http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/07/news/newsmakers/dove_ movies/. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. 
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reveals similar trends.292  PG-rated films produced an average of 
$78.8 million in profit and PG-13-rated films earned an average of 
$45.6 million in profits.293 
These numbers indicate that the market for sanitized films for 
home-viewing could provide enormous profits to the studios.  The 
concern of the studios that their derivative rights may be infringed 
is not petty.  Thus, the conflict between (a) giving strong 
protection to works in order to encourage creation of original 
works and (b) interpreting derivative rights more narrowly in order 
to encourage the advancement of technology now becomes 
striking. 
The courts have looked carefully at the markets exploited by 
alleged infringers of the derivative right.  In its analysis of the last 
factor of the fair-use defense, the effect on the potential market or 
value of the work, Galoob294 focused its concerns on the 
advancement of technology.  Galoob required that the copyright 
owner, Nintendo, “show a reasonable likelihood of a potential 
market for slightly altered versions of the games at suit.”295  
Although the Galoob court recognized precedent which required 
consideration of the effect on the derivative market,296 it found 
support in the facts that Nintendo had not produced or even 
considered producing altered versions of its existing games,297 and 
that Nintendo had failed to show the reasonable likelihood of 
entering a new market with slightly-altered versions of existing 
games.298  The Galoob court found support for this finding in the 
testimony of Galoob’s expert witness, Stephen Beck, who testified 
that: 
junior or expert versions of existing Nintendo games would 
enjoy very little market interest because the original version 
of each game already has been designed to appeal to the 
 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id. 
 294 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 295 Id. at 971 (quoting the district court, Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., 
Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1295 (N.D. Cal. 1991)). 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. 
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largest number of consumers. . . . [A] new game must 
include new material or “the game player is going to feel 
very cheated and robbed, and [the] product will have a bad 
reputation and word of mouth will probably kill its 
sales.”299 
The Galoob court also found support for its finding in the 
testimony of Howard Lincoln, Senior Vice President of Nintendo 
of America, who acknowledged that “Nintendo has no present 
plans to market such games.”300  Thus, the court’s focus on the 
reasonability of the copyright owner’s entrance into a market they 
had not yet entered enabled the court to deny relief to the copyright 
owner and to allow technology to progress.301 
In contrast to Galoob,302 the court in Midway303 focused its 
concern on the protection of the derivative market so that creation 
of original works would be encouraged.  The Midway court held 
that the speeded-up video game at issue constituted a derivative 
work, and that the copyright owner should be allowed to 
monopolize the speeded-up version for the same reasons that the 
copyright owner is allowed to monopolize derivative works under 
the derivative right.304  The Midway court reasoned that “the 
amount by which the language of Section 101 must be stretched to 
accommodate speed-up video games is . . . within the limits within 
which Congress wanted the new Act to operate.”305  The FormGen 
court articulated a similar view in its finding that “by selling [Nuke 
It], Micro Star ‘impinged on [FormGen’s] ability to market new 
versions of the [Duke Nukem 3D] story.’  Only FormGen has a 
 
 299 Id. at 971–72. 
 300 Id. at 972. 
 301 Id. at 969.  “In holding that the audiovisual displays created by the Game Genie are 
not derivative works, we recognize that technology often advances by improvement 
rather than replacement.” Id.  The court found that The Game Genie only enhances a 
Nintendo game’s output, thus, the court concluded that “[s]uch innovations rarely will 
constitute infringing derivative works under the Copyright Act.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 302 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 303 Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 304 Id. at 1014. 
 305 Id. 
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right to enter that market; whether it chooses to do so is entirely its 
business.”306 
In the case of the movie-editing software, the timings that 
instruct the DVD player to skip or mute objectionable material are 
contained in the software.307  However, like the devices at issue in 
Galoob and FormGen, these timings are useless without a copy of 
the original movie.308  The editing software does not contain any 
copyrighted material, but instead instructs the DVD player which 
materials to use.  The distinction between Galoob and FormGen 
that seems to have led to their opposite conclusions regarding the 
liability of the defendants in those actions is that the Nuke It CD at 
issue in FormGen created truly new levels in the game309 instead 
of merely altering the existing aspects of the game, as the Game 
Genie did in Galoob.310  The software here, compares more closely 
with Galoob’s Game Genie.  The software does not create a new, 
distinct “sequel” to the movie, but rather eliminates existing 
aspects of the movie. 
However, in contrast with the factual situation before the 
Galoob court, whose decision was influenced by the fact that 
Nintendo could not reasonably market the slightly-altered 
games,311 here, the movie studios could reasonably market the 
slightly-altered movies.  The consumers purchasing either the 
physically-edited copies of movies or the editing software are 
distinct from the average viewer of the movies selected for editing.  
These consumers do not feel “cheated and robbed” by the slightly-
altered versions of the movies nor do they “bad mouth” the 
product, as Galoob’s expert witness, Mr. Beck, testified the 
Nintendo consumers would do if Nintendo were to produce a 
slightly-altered version of its game.312  Instead, the e-rated industry 
 
 306 Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 307 Kerns, supra note 17, at 489–92. 
 308 Id. at 489–90; Mitakis, supra note 16, at 294; Nokes, supra note 16, at 619–21. 
 309 See FormGen, 154 F.3d at 1112–13. 
 310 Id. at 1111; Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
 311 Galoob, 964 F.2d at 971–72. 
 312 Id. 
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offers slightly-altered versions of the original movies to a distinct 
market and has experienced rapid growth within that market.313 
Moreover, although only one movie studio has targeted 
individual consumers on a small scale, multiple movie studios have 
worked with airline and television networks to develop sanitized 
versions of the movies.314  The importance of the collaboration 
between the movie studios and the airlines and television networks 
is that the difficult, artistic decisions have been made, which are 
necessary to edit films with mature content so that they are suitable 
for children.  Therefore, it would not be unreasonable for the 
movie studios to enter the market of sanitized movies for the 
individual consumer.  Studios could offer physically-altered 
versions.  Or, if they preferred to take advantage of the digital 
editing technology, the translation of the timings of the edits made 
to create the physically-altered copies to the editing software 
should be a mundane task.  Applying the reasoning of the 
Galoob,315 FormGen,316 and Midway317 courts to the editing 
software leads to the conclusion that the editing companies have 
impinged upon the studios’ copyrights.  It would be reasonable for 
the studios to enter the market exploited by the editing 
companies.318  A copyright owner has a right to monopolize 
derivative works which incorporate his original, copyrighted work 
and enter the markets the derivative works exploit.319 
 
 313 Mitakis, supra note 16, at 292.  “CleanFlicks experienced fast growth to 
approximately seventy stores in eighteen states in the Midwest and West including 
California, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, Ohio and Oregon.” Id. 
 314 Glasser, supra note 17, at 176; Mitakis, supra note 16, at 293; Nokes, supra note 16, 
at 615–16; see Aguilar, supra note 18 (reporting that studios have worked with television 
networks and airlines to produce sanitized movies); Luzadder, supra note 281 (stating 
that the Dove Foundation of Michigan announced an agreement that Warner Brothers 
will endorse Dove’s sanitized versions of movies made by Warner Brothers); see also 
supra note 281. 
 315 964 F.2d 965. 
 316 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 317 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 318 Cf. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 971–72. 
 319 FormGen, 154 F.3d at 1113; Midway, 704 F.2d at 1014. 
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D.  The Statutory Language and Legislative History of the 
Copyright Act Strongly Suggest That Fixation Is Not Required 
to Infringe the Derivative Right 
The implication of the statutory language and the legislative 
history on the unfixed, altered works must also be considered.  The 
analysis of the statutory use of the word “prepare” in granting the 
derivative right,320 rather than “create,” whose definition includes a 
requirement of fixation,321 is not entirely conclusive.  Even if the 
conclusion that the statutory use of the word “prepare” in the grant 
of derivative rights were dismissed as distinguishing between the 
type of labor the author performs rather than distinguishing among 
fixed or unfixed works, or as saying nothing about the 
requirements for infringement of the derivative right at all, the 
legislative history of the derivative right indicates in plain 
language that to infringe the derivative right, the infringing work 
need not be fixed.322 
This concept is supported by the observation in the Nimmer 
treatise that infringement of the derivative right necessarily also 
infringes either the reproduction right or the performance right.323  
In making a contradictory conclusion that the language in the Act 
is not ambiguous, the Nimmer treatise describes the statements in 
the legislative history regarding the dual standard for 
copyrightability and infringement of derivative works as “fleeting 
remarks,” and asserts that they, therefore, should be ignored.324  
However, because fixation is one of the two elements of 
copyrightability and is required for infringement of at least some of 
the exclusive rights granted, it is unlikely that Congress treated the 
topic lightly in its discussion of the infringement of the derivative 
right.  Congress goes into much detail to describe what constitutes 
fixation325 and what constitutes infringement of the derivative 
 
 320 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000). 
 321 Id. § 101. 
 322 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975). 
 323 2 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8.09[A]. 
 324 Id. 
 325 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 52–53 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 51–52 (1975). 
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right.326  It seems implausible that a statement concerning the lack 
of a requirement of fixation for works that may infringe the 
derivative right of the copyright owner would be a “fleeting 
remark.”  Moreover, the fact that Congress presently feels the need 
to exempt the editing software from liability under the Family 
Movie Act327 suggests that Congress stills maintains that the 
infringement of the derivative right does not require fixation. 
E.  Concern for the Incentive Structure of the Copyright Act 
Supports the Protection of the Derivative Right 
The incentive structure of Copyright Act must also be 
considered in relation to the unfixed, altered works created by the 
editing software.  The incentive structure behind the Act’s grant of 
derivative rights has two, often interrelated, aspects.  First, the 
protection of the derivative right encourages the author to add 
something to the original work to give it “new expression, 
meaning, or message”328 which furthers the purpose of the 
Copyright Act.329  Second, as a result of the development of the 
last factor of the fair-use analysis, the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work,330 
protection of the author’s exclusive right to enter potential markets, 
which are distinct from the market in which the copyrighted work 
originally exploited, serves to protect the author’s derivative 
right.331  In an application of these concepts to the altered versions 
of the movies created by the software, it is clear that the altered 
versions do not contain “new expression, meaning, or message,”332 
but that they do target a distinct market.333  Because the movie 
studios already sanitize movies for airlines and television 
 
 326 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 61–62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975). 
 327 Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–9, §§ 201–202, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 328 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 329 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); 
Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499 (11th Cir. 1984); Birnhack, 
supra note 211, at 269. 
 330 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
 331 Id. 
 332 Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 333 Mitakis, supra note 16, at 292. 
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networks, the market is one that the movie studios could 
reasonably enter, although it thus far has remained relatively 
untapped.334 
In sum, the current copyright law is the result of much 
reflection on the purpose of the Copyright Act.  The development 
of derivative rights is one specific aspect of this reflection.  The 
concepts articulated in the case law and scholarly articles on 
derivative rights, as well as the statutory language of and 
legislative history behind the derivative right, indicate that 
infringement of the derivative right need not require fixation.  
However, proper restraints should be placed on this 
pronouncement so as not to impede the advancement of 
technology. 
CONCLUSION 
The determination of whether alterations enabled by 
technology violate the copyright owner’s monopoly should be 
made under the existing internal restraints on copyright, the idea-
expression dichotomy and the fair-use doctrine.  In the case of the 
altered versions of the movies produced by the editing software, 
Congress has already weighed the interests affected and spoken on 
the subject in its Family Movie Act, indicating that, in this case, 
the interests of the consumer weigh more heavily than the interests 
of the copyright owners in the emerging market. 
In defining the scope of the protection afforded to copyright 
owners from unfixed works which potentially infringe their 
derivative rights, I propose that two considerations be considered 
in the matrix of competing interests.  First, if the technology is able 
to reproduce the altered version in an identical fashion infinitely, 
this is equivalent to fixation.  Thus, unfixed, altered works which 
 
 334 Glasser, supra note 17, at 176; Mitakis, supra note 16, at 293; Nokes supra note 16, 
at 615–16; see Aguilar, supra note 18 (reporting that studios have worked with television 
networks and airlines to produce sanitized movies); Luzadder, supra note 281 (stating 
that the Dove Foundation of Michigan announced an agreement that Warner Brothers 
will endorse Dove’s sanitized versions of movies made by Warner Brothers); see also 
supra note 281. 
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cannot be reproduced in the same manner repeatedly would be 
protected from liability. 
Second, the Galoob court developed a concept of market 
exploitation which might prove useful in efforts to protect the 
copyright owner’s derivative rights without impeding the 
progression of technology.  Under the fair-use analysis, courts 
should not only consider whether the defendant is exploiting a 
potential market for the copyrighted work, but they should also 
consider whether it would be reasonable for the copyright owner 
to enter the market exploited by the alleged infringer.335  If so, 
liability should be imposed.  If not, the market development should 
not be considered an infringement. 
Putting aside the exemptions under the Family Movie Act, the 
application of the first factor to the editing software, whether the 
unfixed, altered versions can be reproduced in an identical fashion 
infinitely, tends towards a finding of liability.  The altered versions 
clearly can be reproduced in an identical fashion infinitely.  A 
consumer merely has to leave the settings at the same levels and 
the identical material will be skipped or muted.  Thus, this factor 
favors the movie studios. 
Under the second factor, whether it would be reasonable for the 
copyright owners to enter the market exploited by the alleged 
infringer, the editing companies target a market which, unlike the 
market in Galoob,336 is a reasonable market for the studios to 
target.  Moreover, the movie studios have worked with airlines and 
television networks to develop sanitized versions of their films, 
and thus have already made the artistic decisions necessary to edit 
individual films with offensive material so that they are 
appropriate for children.  Under Midway337 and FormGen,338 the 
studios should be able to choose whether to enter this market and 
how to enter this market.  Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of 
the movie studios. 
 
 335 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc, 964 F.2d 965, 971–72 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 336 Id. 
 337 Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1014 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 338 Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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In total, the balance of the competing interests under copyright 
law of the copyright owners and the public tend toward a finding 
of infringement.  In this particular situation, Congress has 
exempted the editing software from any finding of infringement 
under the Family Movie Act.  This Act was passed to protect the 
technology developed and the consumers’ interest in having the 
ability to skip or mute objectionable material.339  If the analysis 
presented in this note were to be accepted by courts, without the 
exemption under the Family Movie Act, the software companies 
would face a credible challenge by the movie studios in a dispute 
over the scope of the studios’ rights under the Copyright Act. 
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